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Income Volatility and Certifi cation 
Duration for WIC Children
Mark A. Prell 
Economic Research Service
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture administers 15 domestic food 
assistance programs, including the Special Supplemental Nutrition 
Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Policymakers es-
tablish program benefi ts and set criteria that determine who is eligible 
to receive benefi ts. WIC benefi ts include nutrition counseling, health 
referrals, and vouchers (“food instruments”) that enable WIC clients 
to obtain particular sets of nutritious foods from authorized retailers. 
A common criterion for food assistance programs is a limit on income 
relative to the poverty line. The household income limit for WIC is 185 
percent of poverty.1
People’s incomes are not steady forever. Income volatility implies 
that, in any given month, the household income of a WIC client might 
exceed the guidelines for eligibility. At a recertifi cation, WIC obtains 
updated information from the client. Recertifi cation is an administra-
tive tool by which WIC can ascertain whether a client has become in-
eligible. When a client is detected to be ineligible, WIC benefi ts are 
terminated. When a client is found to be eligible, the client may receive 
WIC benefi ts until the next recertifi cation. The length of time between 
recertifi cations is known as certifi cation duration.
I develop an economic model of an “optimal” certifi cation dura-
tion that examines the policy tradeoff between recertifi cation costs and 
benefi t targeting—getting program benefi ts to those who are eligible to 
receive them. While the model has implications for food assistance pro-
grams in general, I use certifi cations for WIC children as a case study 
for simulations of optimal certifi cation durations. 
WIC benefi ts will be called warranted if the client is eligible in the 
same month that the client receives the program benefi ts—i.e., if the 
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client’s current monthly income meets the monthly eligibility guide-
lines. If instead the client is ineligible in the current month because 
of income volatility since the application, the client’s benefi ts will be 
called unwarranted. WIC will terminate the client’s benefi ts at recerti-
fi cation once benefi ts are detected to be unwarranted. 
A shorter recertifi cation period fosters targeting of benefi ts to those 
clients who are eligible. Frequent recertifi cations detect and terminate 
unwarranted benefi ts more quickly. Because WIC benefi ts constitute a 
transfer payment from taxpayers to clients, it may seem that terminat-
ing payments to ineligibles is simply a zero-sum change. However, be-
cause of taxation, fi nancing WIC benefi ts entails a marginal effi ciency 
cost. Improved benefi t targeting that reduces unwarranted benefi ts pro-
vides economic savings in terms of reduced excess burden (deadweight 
loss) from taxes. Thus there is a social gain to a shorter certifi cation 
duration. 
On the other hand, shortening the certifi cation duration adds to re-
certifi cation costs. Real resources involved with recertifi cation include 
staff and equipment costs to WIC (and ultimately, to taxpayers) and a 
client’s opportunity cost of time and out-of-pocket travel expenses. 
The next section provides a static benefi t-cost framework to analyze 
whether or not to conduct a single recertifi cation. This artifi cially sim-
ple framework neglects recertifi cation’s critical intertemporal issues to 
focus fi rst on valuation issues of what factors constitute economic ben-
efi ts and costs for the problem. The third section develops the optimal 
certifi cation duration model, which captures recertifi cation’s dynamic 
aspects. The fourth section uses the certifi cation duration model to 
simulate sets of optimal certifi cation duration for children in WIC. The 
structure of the certifi cation duration model resembles “inspection” or 
“preparedness” models for maintenance and replacement of stochasti-
cally failing equipment, including work by Barlow and Proschan (1996); 
Jorgenson, McCall, and Radner (1967); and Radner and Jorgenson 
(1962). The simulations most closely resemble work in Greenfi eld and 
Persselin (2002).
The case study involves WIC children. There are fi ve groups of 
WIC participants: 1) pregnant women, 2) breast-feeding women, 3) non-
breast-feeding postpartum women, 4) infants (up to one year old), and 
5) children (one through four years of age). Total food costs for WIC 
in fi scal 2005 were $3.6 billion.2 The certifi cation duration issue can be 
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considered more salient for WIC children than for other WIC clients, 
since children make up half of the program’s participants,3 have the 
longest period for which they can be eligible—up to four years—and 
are recertifi ed in WIC every six months, a time frame that potentially 
constitutes several recertifi cations over a full four-year participation 
period. 
While WIC’s actual certifi cation duration for children is six months, 
the estimated optimal certifi cation duration is 12 months in a baseline 
simulation that uses best-guess values for parameters. When the simula-
tion is rerun for sensitivity analysis using alternative parameter values, 
the estimated optimal certifi cation duration ranges from 7 months to 14 
months.
STATIC BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
At a moment in time, under what conditions does conducting a re-
certifi cation for a given client pass a benefi t-cost test? Suppose the cur-
rent month is just beginning, and the client has not yet received month-
ly WIC benefi ts worth M. While the client was eligible at application, 
some time has now passed. The client’s eligibility status is unknown 
unless a recertifi cation is conducted, which is the policy choice. Let 
PEI measure the probability that the client, who was eligible at appli-
cation, is now ineligible. In expectation, unwarranted and warranted 
benefi ts equal PEI M and (1−PEI )M, respectively. Let cA and cC represent 
recertifi cation costs paid (if and only if a recertifi cation is conducted) 
by the WIC agency and the client, respectively. The excess burden, or 
marginal effi ciency cost, per dollar of taxes is given by ε. 
Table 9.1 compares a policy of “Don’t recertify” and a policy of 
“Recertify once” for the current month in isolation, without consider-
ing future possible months; the next section takes the future into ac-
count. For the policy of “Don’t recertify” there are no recertifi cation 
costs. Program benefi ts take on three values: 1) the client receives M 
dollars’ worth of monthly WIC benefi ts (whether or not the client is 
currently eligible); 2) the taxpayer bears a cost of −M and, in addition, 
an excess burden of −εM, refl ecting taxation’s effi ciency loss; and 3) the 
economic cost to society of WIC benefi ts, after taking into account the 
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Client’s benefi ts 
and costs
Taxpayer’s 
benefi ts and costs Social benefi ts and costs
“Don’t recertify” policy
(1) Recertifi cation costs 0 0 0
(2) Program benefi ts  + M −(1 + ε)M −εM
(3) E[net value] 
(3) = (1)+(2)   −εM 
“Recertify once” policy
(4) Recertifi cation costs −cC −(1 + ε)cA −[(1 + ε) cA + cC]
(5) Program benefi ts if ineligible 
(probability PEI)
0 0 0
(6) Program benefi ts if eligible 
(probability [1 − PEI])
 + M −(1 + ε)M  −εM
(7) E[net value]
(7) = (4) + [PEI(5) + (1 − PEI)(6)]
  (1 − PEI)εM − [(1 + ε) cA + cC]
Benefi t-cost test of “recertify once” policy vs. “don’t recertify” policy
(8) E[net value]
(8) = (7) – (3)
  + PEIεM  − [(1 + ε) cA + cC]
SOURCE: Author’s analysis.
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transfer-payment aspect of M, is −εM in row (3). Rows (4) through (7) 
examine the “Recertify once” policy. Recertifi cation costs are shown in 
(4). In (5), if with probability PEI  the client is currently ineligible, WIC 
benefi ts are terminated. In (6), with probability (1 − PEI ) the client is 
currently eligible, and WIC benefi ts are paid. The expected net value in 
row (7) of the “Recertify once” policy shows terms that are the total of 
(4) and the probability-weighted values in (5) and (6).  
Row (8) shows the net gain of adopting the “Recertify once” policy 
in place of the “Don’t recertify” policy as the difference between (7) 
and (3): 
(9.1) E[NV] = PEIεM − [(1 + ε)cA + cC] .
Recertifi cation passes a static benefi t-cost test when the E[NV] in Equa-
tion (9.1) is positive. In Equation (9.1), recertifi cation saves neither 
warranted benefi ts nor their excess burden because the policy choice 
does not affect payments of warranted benefi ts. Under the “Recertify 
once” policy, WIC benefi ts are paid out so long as they are warranted, 
and warranted benefi ts (like unwarranted benefi ts) are also paid under 
the “Don’t recertify” policy. Instead, (9.1) shows that the economic gain 
from recertifi cation is PEIεM—the excess burden of fi nancing WIC ben-
efi ts, εM, with probability PEI  that those benefi ts are unwarranted. The 
link to unwarranted benefi ts can also be shown by rewriting that gain 
as ε(PEI M), where unwarranted benefi ts are PEI M. Because the term εM 
recurs often in the optimal certifi cation duration model, it will simply 
be designated m. 
In the static benefi t-cost analysis, a “Recertify once” policy tends to 
have a positive E[NV] when, holding other factors constant, any one of 
the following four conditions occur:  1) “income volatility” is relatively 
high (in the sense of a high value for PEI ), 2) monthly benefi ts M are 
relatively high, 3) the excess burden of taxation ε is relatively high, or 
4) the recertifi cation costs for the agency and the client are relatively 
low. These same lessons can be expected to hold more generally for 
other food assistance programs. 
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OPTIMAL CERTIFICATION DURATION MODEL
The static benefi t-cost analysis highlighted valuation issues, but it 
ignored intertemporal issues that matter for recertifi cation policy. First, 
the static analysis treated PEI  as an exogenous constant, but PEI (t) can 
systematically depend on time. Second, if ineligibility is detected and 
benefi ts are terminated at some time, excess burden m is saved not only 
for the current month but also for future months that would have had 
payments if WIC benefi ts had continued until a future recertifi cation. 
Thus, future fl ows of m and their expected discounted values will mat-
ter for optimal decision-making. Third, the static analysis did not model 
how decision-making for any one recertifi cation affects outcomes of 
possible future recertifi cations. The optimal certifi cation duration mod-
el takes into account these three issues, and this section considers each 
in turn. 
Income Volatility and State Probability Paths
At the time of application and initial certifi cation, time 0, the WIC 
agency determines that the client is eligible. The time of transition from 
eligibility to ineligibility is a random variable that can be called a time 
to “failure.” The failure distribution F(t) is the cumulative probability 
distribution showing the probability that the time to “failure”—ineligi-
bility—is less than or equal to t:
(9.2) 
0
( ) ( ) { }
t
F t f u du Prob time to failure t
where f(t) is the associated probability density for F(t) given by dF(t)/dt. 
Although the client’s current state—eligible or ineligible—is unknown, 
it is assumed that F(t) is known to policymakers from past data on other 
clients that resemble the one being considered. A companion to the fail-
ure distribution is the reliability (or survivor) function R(t), which is 
the probability a client is still eligible as of time t—or, equivalently, the 
probability that the time of transition to ineligibility is greater than t. 
The relationship between R(t) and F(t) is simply
(9.3) ( ) 1 ( ) { }R t F t Prob time to failure t .
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The hazard rate (also known as the “hazard function” or the “failure 
rate”) h(t) is the probability that the client will transition to ineligibility 
within an instantaneously small interval at time t, conditioned on hav-
ing reached t as eligible (i.e., conditioned on not transitioning prior to 
t). The hazard rate can be expressed using the failure distribution or the 
reliability function:
(9.4) ( ) ( )( ) .
1 ( ) ( )
F t R th t
F t R t
Like previous work, the certifi cation duration model adopts the 
common simplifying assumption that the reliability function for the eli-
gible client to remain eligible is exponential:
(9.5) R(t) = e−λt , t ≥ 0 .
The hazard rate of (9.5) for transition from E to I is a constant λ. The 
failure distribution is
(9.6) ( ) 1 , 0tF t e t  .
The expected duration of a continuous spell in E is (1/λ) from the start 
of the spell. 
The exponential distribution has been used in equipment mainte-
nance and inspection models by Barlow and Proschan (1996); Jorgenson, 
McCall, and Radner (1967); and Radner and Jorgenson (1962). A key 
feature of the exponential distribution is its “memoryless” property, by 
which the reliability function for equipment that is inspected and found 
to be in good working order at some time is the same reliability function 
for the newly installed equipment as of time 0. The hazard rate to failure 
for a newly installed piece of equipment is λ, and at any point in the 
future—before or after inspection—the hazard rate is still λ. Inspection 
serves as a “regeneration” or “renewal” that returns the problem’s sto-
chastic characteristics to time 0.4
All models make simplifying assumptions. Despite the potential 
limitations of the exponential function, its advantage is that it pro-
vides the easiest dynamic structure for the optimal certifi cation dura-
tion model. Moreover, in the next section, data are presented that show 
that the actual probability paths for some households’ income dynamics 
up08djivafch9.indd   265 10/8/2008   10:41:51 AM
266   Prell
are approximated well by the theoretical probability path predicted on 
the basis of the exponential distribution. Even if the assumption of an 
exponential distribution does not hold precisely in actual data, much 
can be learned about the trade-offs faced by program administrators by 
considering the optimal certifi cation duration model. The more closely 
actual hazard rates are constants, the better the model’s simulations will 
serve as fi rst-order approximations.
A constant hazard rate is a strength of the exponential distribution 
(making diffi cult problems analytically tractable) as well as a potential 
limitation. More advanced models that allow for nonconstant hazard 
rates may build on the foundations provided by the optimal certifi ca-
tion duration model developed here. When hazard rates depend on time, 
the model’s solution would almost certainly involve a set of sequential 
recertifi cation periods of differing lengths. A second limitation of the 
exponential distribution, and one shared by many distributions, is that 
its cumulative probability of transition approaches 1.0. It would be of 
interest to generalize the model by allowing some fraction of WIC cli-
ents to have zero probability of “failure,” i.e., of ever having enough 
income to become ineligible. That complexity is not attempted here.
A complexity that is incorporated into the certifi cation duration 
model, generalizing the models of the equipment maintenance litera-
ture, is permitting transitions not only from I to E but also from E to 
I. It is natural for analysis of optimal equipment maintenance to adopt 
the assumption that a transition into “failed” is irreversible: machines 
do not spontaneously fi x themselves. The optimal certifi cation duration 
model relaxes the assumption that failure is an “absorbing” state, with 
no return possible, because income volatility can move a household 
from eligibility to ineligibility and, at some random time later, back into 
eligibility. Such a possibility is captured by a “two-state transition pro-
cess” or “alternating renewal process.” Boskin and Nold (1975) consid-
ered it when examining the states of “participation” and “nonparticipa-
tion” in modeling the AFDC program. Lancaster (1990) considered it 
for the states of employment and unemployment.
In the next section, titled “Application: WIC Children’s Certifi ca-
tion Duration,” data are presented that show that the actual two-state 
probability paths for some households’ income dynamics are approxi-
mated well by the theoretical probability path predicted on the basis of 
the exponential distribution. 
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Let G(t) represent the failure distribution for transition from I to 
E. G(t) pertains to a formerly eligible, currently ineligible client who 
reenters E because of an income decrease, where 
(9.7) ( ) 1 , 0tG t e t  .
A (formerly eligible) client who is ineligible at any given time ex-
hibits the hazard rate μ for the conditional probability of transitioning 
from I back to E.5 The expected duration of a continuous spell in I is 
(1/μ) from the start of the spell.
Just as inspection returned stochastic properties back to time 0 in 
equipment maintenance models that used a one-way transition assump-
tion, so too does recertifi cation serve as a regeneration point under two-
way transitions between E and I. Let the probability that a client occu-
pies a given state E or I at a given time t be a “state probability,” given 
by πE(t) and πI (t), respectively. Generalizing a numerical example from 
Howard (1960), state probabilities are either
(9.8)
 ( ) ( )( ) (0) (0)t tE E It e e
or
(9.9)
( ) ( )( ) (0) (0) ,t tI E It e e
where the probabilities πE (0) and πI (0) represent the probability that the 
client is in E or I at whatever “initial” time 0 is considered. Suppose the 
initial time of the problem is taken to be the time of application (and 
initial certifi cation) of the client. At application, the WIC agency knows 
that πE (0) = 1 and πI (0) = 0. For the eligible client, (9.8) and (9.9) each 
reduce to a set of conditional state probabilities, i.e., to state probabili-
ties (for E or I ) conditioned on initial eligibility at time 0, which can be 
written as PEE (t) and PEI (t):6
(9.10) ( )( ) ;tEEP t e
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(9.11) ( )( ) .tEIP t e  
Not surprisingly, the stochastic time profi les PEE (t) and PEI (t) sum to 1 
at all t: a client (who is eligible at time zero) is either in state E or state 
I at any given time.7 These state probability paths approach steady-state 
values monotonically: PEE (t) is downward-sloping for all t, while PEI (t) 
is upward-sloping. What those behaviors mean, in practice, is that the 
probability of detecting that a client is ineligible at time t strictly in-
creases as more time passes.
Consider next a recertifi cation after some amount of time T has 
passed since application or the last recertifi cation. Because of the mem-
oryless property, the recertifi cation serves as a “regeneration” of the 
two-state stochastic process of transitioning between states E and I. The 
stochastic time profi les PEE (t) and PEI (t) hold for an eligible client at 
time 0 by using πE (0) = 1 and πI (0) = 0 in (9.8) and (9.9). Similarly, at 
recertifi cation at T, πE (T) = 1 and πI (T) = 0 for the client who is found, 
because of the process of recertifi cation itself, to be eligible at T. Using 
those values in (9.8) and (9.9) again results in the same stochastic pro-
fi les at T as were found at time 0. That is, viewed from time T, the same 
PEE (t) and PEI (t) time paths are obtained that were derived at initial time 
0 (so long as t is interpreted as “duration time from the last recertifi ca-
tion” rather than calendar time). In short, recertifi cation can serve as a 
new initial time.8 The same result holds at each successive recertifi ca-
tion—at 2T, 3T, and so forth after time 0. 
A Single Optimal Recertifi cation
The central role of discounting in a dynamic certifi cation duration 
model is considered in the context of the optimal timing of a single 
recertifi cation at time T, to be chosen by WIC. The per-certifi cation 
cost is given by c equaling [(1 + ε) cA + cC], as in the static benefi t-cost 
test. The present value of c at time 0, with ρ as the instantaneous social 
discount rate, is D(T):
(9.12) ( ) TD T e c . 
A delay in recertifi cation lowers D(T) through postponement of the re-
certifi cation cost c. 
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Let U(T) measure the expected discounted excess burden of unwar-
ranted benefi ts that cumulate up to recertifi cation time T:
(9.13) ( )
0 0
( ) ( )
T T
t t t
EIU T m e P t dt m e e dt .
U(T) has three components. The excess burden component m (where 
m is εM) measures the fl ow of potential savings of excess burden from 
fi nancing WIC benefi ts. The state probability path PEI (t) registers for 
each instant the likelihood that the excess burden from unwarranted 
benefi ts occurs at that moment. Each instant’s fl ow is discounted by ρ 
to initial time. The cumulative aspect of U(T) means that these expected 
discounted fl ows are added up by integration between 0 and T.
Upon evaluation of (4.2), U(T) is given by
(9.14)
 1 1( ) 1 1 TTU T m e e
 
.
The present value of an infi nite stream of m is m/ρ. Importantly, the 
value of U(T) in the limit takes on a smaller value, as follows:
(9.15) ( ) .lim
T
mU U T
Thus, if no inspection were ever to occur—i.e., if T were infi nitely 
delayed—the expected excess burden of unwarranted benefi ts would 
be less than m/ρ because (in expectation) only a portion of the fl ow of 
excess burden m is paid to a client during times of ineligibility. The 
value that U(T) approaches will be closer to (m/ρ) as λ is larger and μ 
is smaller relative to ρ, inasmuch as those income volatility parameters 
capture the rates at which clients have E-I and I-E transitions.
Expected discounted total cost for a single-recertifi cation problem 
is given by
(9.16) [ ( )] ( ) ( ) ( )0 ( ) .T EI EEE DC T U T D T e P T P T U
In (9.16), a fl ow of excess burden from unwarranted benefi ts is ac-
cruing in expectation until time T, given by U(T). At T, a recertifi cation 
up08djivafch9.indd   269 10/8/2008   10:41:52 AM
270   Prell
cost is paid (with certainty) for which the present value is D(T). At re-
certifi cation the client is found to be ineligible with probability PEI (T), 
in which case payments are terminated (meaning future payments equal 
0) and the problem is over. Or, with probability PEE (T), the client is 
found to be eligible and the payment of program benefi ts forever be-
gins. That is, if the client passes the problem’s single recertifi cation, 
the fl ow of m continues uninterrupted from T onward without limit. 
Discounting the two probability-weighted outcomes of recertifi cation 
at T (of 0 and of U∞) back to initial time 0, in order to express them in 
present value terms, completes (9.16).  
Minimization of (9.16) results in the fi rst-order condition
(9.17) ( *) ( *) ( *) 0EI EE EEP T m c P T U P T U  .
The problem’s second-order condition for minimization is
(9.18) ( *) ( *) ( *) 0EI EE EEP T m P T U P T U  . 
The optimality condition (9.17) can be reexpressed in terms of mar-
ginal gains and marginal losses from delayed recertifi cation. To use a 
single state probability path and its derivative, note that PEI'(t) = −PEE'(t), 
which follows from PEI (t) = [1 − PEE(t)], so that (9.17) becomes
(9.19) ( *) [1 ( *)] ( *)EI EI EIP T U c P T U P T m .
 
The fi rst term shows a gain from delayed recertifi cation: a slight 
delay in T* increases the probability that ineligibility will be detected 
at the recertifi cation, thereby saving U∞. The second term captures an 
additional gain from delaying payment of the per-recertifi cation cost c: 
that cost will be paid sooner or later, but if it is later then in effect the 
implicit interest earnings from delayed payment equal ρc. That is, if c 
were invested in the bank, earning instantaneous rate ρ until recertifi ca-
tion, then proceeds from waiting until the next instant for recertifi cation 
and earning ρ meanwhile on the invested capital of c is ρc. There is 
another gain associated with interest earnings. As of T, there is a prob-
ability [1 – PEI (T )] that the client is eligible and that at recertifi cation 
the client will be due monthly benefi ts M forever, costing m forever, 
which is tantamount to a lump-sum cost (in present value as of T) of 
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U∞. A slight delay in recertifi cation means that that lump-sum value is 
not paid yet. The lump-sum value can be invested in the bank to accrue 
interest, resulting in the third term. The term on the right-hand side is 
the instantaneous cost of delayed recertifi cation. That cost results from 
not terminating the stream of m for a client who is already ineligible 
(with probability PEI [T ]). The optimal T* in (9.19) balances these four 
terms. 
Making use of (9.15) to express U∞ in (9.19) as a function of m 
(and the parameters λ, μ, and ρ) and then dividing (9.19) throughout 
by m reveals an important feature of the problem. At the optimum, the 
only dependence T* has on c and on m is through the term (ρc/m)—i.e., 
through their relative values.
Optimal Periodic Recertifi cations
The single-recertifi cation problem just considered resembles the 
tree-cutting problem of Fisher. Both problems assume that an action—
whether recertifi cation or tree harvesting—is taken once, whereupon 
the problem is over. In this section, the optimal certifi cation duration 
model incorporates multiple stochastic cycles to recognize that a deci-
sion about any one recertifi cation affects the likelihoods and outcomes 
of future recertifi cations.
Suppose WIC determined at time 0 that the optimal length of the 
fi rst certifi cation duration is T1*. For a client who is eligible at the fi rst 
recertifi cation, the problem as of T1* for the second certifi cation dura-
tion, T2*, resembles precisely, in its stochastic specifi cation, the prob-
lem as of time 0 for how long to specify the fi rst certifi cation duration 
(because of the memoryless property and the infi nite-horizon feature 
of the model). Thus, the problem will yield the same solution, that T2* 
= T1*. Moreover, each certifi cation duration will be the same optimal 
length. Although there are multiple cycles, the problem condenses to 
selecting a single optimal T*, taking into account all possible future 
cycles. The problem will have recertifi cations at times T*, 2T*, 3T*, 
and further multiples of T*. 
S(T) and M(T) refer to costs associated with a single cycle and with 
multiple cycles, respectively. M(T) is derived from S(T). The expected 
discounted cost of the (fi rst) cycle from 0 to T is given by
(9.20) E[S(T )] = U(T ) + D(T ) .
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The within-cycle discounted cost of the second cycle from T to 2T, 
or within any future cycle, is also E[S(T )]. Because E[S(T )] appropri-
ately discounts within-cycle costs only to the start of the cycle, the pres-
ent value of a cycle’s cost involves discounting that value back to time 
0. Conditioned on the client being eligible at T, that value for the second 
cycle would be
(9.21) { # 2 } [ ( )]TPV Cycle eligibility at T e E S T  ,
and more generally for future cycles n = 2, 3, 4, . . . , the value is
(9.22) ( 1){ # ( 1) } [ ( )] .n TPV Cycle n eligibility at n T e E S T  
In (9.22) the present value is conditioned on the client being eligible 
at a given recertifi cation. As of time 0, those outcomes are uncertain. 
For example, only with a probability PEE(T ) will the client be found to 
be eligible at the fi rst recertifi cation. With probability PEI(T) the client 
is ineligible and benefi ts are terminated. The second cycle’s (uncondi-
tioned) expected present value is
(9.23) { # 2} ( ) [ ( )] ( )(0) .T EE EIEPV Cycle e P T E S T P T
The third cycle commences if the client passes the second recertifi ca-
tion, and that is possible only if the client has already passed the fi rst 
recertifi cation with probability PEE(T ):
(9.24) { #3} ( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )(0) .TEE EE EIEPV Cycle P T e P T E S T P T
The fourth cycle is reached on condition that the third cycle was begun, 
an event that requires passing two recertifi cations in a row with prob-
ability PEE(T)2. Most generally, 
(9.25)    
2 ( 1){ # } ( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )(0) ,n n TEE EE EIEPV Cycle n P T e P T E S T P T
where the term [PEE(T)]n−2 refl ects the number of recertifi cations that 
must be passed with uninterrupted successes to reach the start of any 
given cycle n.9
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M(T) is the sum of the expected present value of each successive 
cycle:
 
(9.26) ( ) [ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( )(0)T EE EIM T E S T e P T E S T P T
 
2( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( )(0)TEE EE EIP T e P T E S T P T
 
 2 3[ ( )] ( ) [ ( )] ( )(0)TEE EE EIP T e P T E S T P T 
  2[ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )]T TEE EEE S T e P T E S T e P T E S T  
           + 




1 ( )T EE
E S T
e P T
The fi nal line in (9.26) follows from viewing M(T) as the infi nite sum of 
terms that involve a geometric sequence. It is helpful to express E[S(T)] 
by its two components, U(T) and D(T):
(9.27) ( ) ( )( ) .
1 ( ) 1 ( )T TEE EE
U T D TM T
e P T e P T
 
In (9.27) M(T) is clearly the sum of two cost curves (in expected 
present value, across multiple stochastic cycles), one for excess bur-
den of unwarranted benefi ts and one for recertifi cation costs. These 
two curves are depicted in Figure 9.1, together with the “Total cost” 
curve given by M(T). Optimal T* is that value of T at which M(T) is 
minimized.
In the simulation, M(T) is calculated using the functions and pa-
rameters in (9.27), and then letting T increase in one-month increments. 
(An upper limit of 99 months was examined.) The optimal certifi ca-
tion duration, at T*, is identifi ed as the last month in which the change 
M(T*) − M(T* − 1) is negative: a month past T* results in an increase in 
M(T), so M(T) is minimized at T*.
Time Horizons
An infi nite-horizon specifi cation embodied in (9.16) and (9.26) is 
helpful for distilling the dynamic essence of the benefi ts and costs ac-
crued from delaying recertifi cation. It is appropriate to consider how 
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well an infi nite-horizon specifi cation can be used for conducting sim-
ulations of WIC children’s optimal certifi cation duration in the next 
section. 
While in many cases it is less accurate to use an infi nite-horizon 
rather than a fi nite-horizon specifi cation, the infi nite-horizon version is 
typically less complex. Its degree of accuracy depends, in part, on the 
length of the appropriate fi nite horizon and the social discount rate. The 
longer the fi nite horizon, the more accurate the infi nite-horizon simpli-
fi cation will be. Accuracy is also better when the social discount rate is 
higher, which decreases the present value of any given future benefi t 
or cost (values that are retained in the infi nite-horizon specifi cation but 
that might be cut off after a fi nite horizon). 
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EPV (excess burden of unwarranted benefits)
EPV (total cost)
SOURCE: Author’s analysis.
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The issue of an appropriate time horizon is pertinent for the case 
study on WIC children because the length of their participation is at 
most four years (up to age fi ve). In the end, whether or not an infi -
nite-horizon specifi cation is a good approximation for WIC children 
depends in part on the numerical results of the simulation. If the so-
called optimal certifi cation duration T* from the simulation is estimated 
at, say, seven or eight years, the use of the infi nite-horizon clearly has a 
serious weakness: by neglecting the four-year maximum, the estimate 
T* exceeds the upper limit of age-based eligibility. On the other hand, 
if the simulation’s estimated T* is, say, a few months, the estimate is 
short relative to a four-year maximum participation, and the difference 
between infi nite- and fi nite-horizon specifi cations may be negligible. 
Even then, however, the simulation’s optimal certifi cation duration does 
fi t best for a one-year-old, who has the longest potential participation. 
Accuracy diminishes when a child is older and thus closer to the upper 
limit on age requirements.
APPLICATION: WIC CHILDREN’S CERTIFICATION 
DURATION
This section uses the optimal certifi cation duration model to simu-
late T* for a case study of WIC children. Conducting any simulation 
exercise involves more than just specifying an economic model and as-
signing values for key parameters. While there has been some research 
done on certifi cation activities for local WIC agencies (e.g., Macro In-
ternational 1995) certifi cation costs capturing the time involved, from 
both a WIC agency’s and a client’s perspective, have not been studied 
as much for WIC as for food stamps. And while some work has been 
carried out on dynamic income patterns and labor market behavior for 
families with WIC infants and children, the simulations need greater 
month-by-month detail than previous work has presented.10 Informa-
tion on the dollar cost of the WIC food package for children is incom-
plete. Of necessity, the simulations rest on assumptions used to develop 
a set of values for model parameters. A baseline simulation is conducted 
using best-guess values of parameters. To ascertain the effects of al-
ternative assumptions, additional simulations are done as a sensitivity 
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analysis using alternative parameter values. The simulations for option-
al certifi cation durations are tentative, subject to refi nement by improv-
ing the model or the estimates of parameters. 
State Probability Paths of Households with Older Children
A longitudinal approach is needed that will allow the income tra-
jectories of individual households to be followed over time in order 
to identify which months a household is eligible and which months a 
household is ineligible. The simulations draw on results by Newman 
(2006), who identifi ed a set of households that were income-eligible 
for free or reduced-price meals in the National School Lunch Program 
(NSLP) at a particular moment (August at the start of the school year). 
Newman followed that set of households over time to examine, for the 
set as a whole, what percentage were not income-eligible in each suc-
cessive month, yielding a state probability path PEI(t) for NSLP. There 
is a basis for using Newman’s NSLP results for a simulation on WIC 
children: the income limit for reduced-price meals is the same—185 
percent of poverty—as WIC’s income limit. The income dynamics for 
households with older school-aged children are used to approximate the 
income dynamics for households with younger children of WIC age.11 
It so happens that the Newman study contained three moments 
of eligibility, each for the month of August, but in three successive 
years, 1996 through 1998. The fi rst three columns of Table 9.2 show 
Newman’s results by year; the data make use of the seam-adjusted share 
fi gures reported in Newman (2006). 
The table shows that in month 0 (August of each respective year), 
every household retained in the subsample is eligible, making 0.0 per-
cent ineligible. Then, as the months of the school year pass, the percent-
age of households that are ineligible in a given month increases at a 
decreasing rate. The table also shows, in the fourth column, the monthly 
averages across the three years’ state probability fi gures, which yields 
an average state probability path. The average path approaches a value 
that is taken to be a long-run or “steady state” value. The transitional 
nature of the average probability path is seen more readily in Figure 
9.2, which depicts graphically the table’s three-year average path (and 
a fi tted path, described below).12 In order to separate and estimate im-
plicit exponential exit and reentry rates for eligibility, the steady-state 
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probability μ/(λ+μ) toward which the state probability path approaches 
was set (by visual inspection) at 0.25. The rate of approach towards the 
steady-state probability was used to estimate the state probability path 







where the average fi gures of column 4 are used for the data on PEI(t) 
in (9.28). The coeffi cient on time was estimated to be −0.309 (with 
the restriction of zero-intercept imposed), with an R-squared value of 
0.85 for the equation. Based on the estimated coeffi cient, the estimated 
(monthly) value of λ was 7.725 percent, and μ was estimated at 23.175 
percent. It is no accident that the estimated value of μ is precisely three 
times the estimated value of λ: that relationship is implied by the stipu-
lation that the steady-state probability μ/(λ+μ) = 0.25, and it serves as 
the identifi cation restriction by which the two structural parameters are 
obtained from the estimated coeffi cient on time. The fi fth column of the 
table and its accompanying fi gure each show a “fi tted” state probability 
path, based on the estimates of the two structural parameters.
Table 9.2  State Probability Paths of Income Ineligibility, 1996–1998 
(185 percent of poverty, households with school-aged children)
    Average,
1996–1998  FittedMonth 1996 1997 1998
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 13.7 11.8 7.2 10.9 6.6
2 12.9 13.1 11.1 12.4 11.5
3 17.6 21.1 17.0 18.6 15.1
4 19.5 18.4 16.8 18.2 17.7
5 20.3 19.8 19.0 19.7 19.7
6 22.1 23.8 20.0 22.0 21.1
7 23.0 21.6 18.8 21.1 22.1
8 22.2 22.0 20.6 21.6 22.9
9 23.1 23.5 23.8 23.5 23.5
10 25.9 25.3 22.5 24.6 23.9
11 23.3 23.2 23.6 23.4 24.2
SOURCE: Newman (2006), Tables 10–12 and author’s analysis.
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An R-squared value of 0.85 from (9.28) is considered here to be 
a good fi t with the data. It is the empirical support for the claim (in 
the third section) that the actual probability paths for some households’ 
income dynamics are approximated well by the theoretical probability 
path predicted on the basis of the exponential distribution.
Dollar Cost of WIC Children’s Benefi ts
The simulations do not account for the dollar cost of WIC’s nutri-
tion counseling and health referrals: the cost of the WIC food package 
alone is used.
The simulation of the certifi cation duration model requires a fi g-
ure for monthly WIC benefi ts for children. The children’s package con-
Figure 9.2  Average and Fitted State Probability Paths of Income 
Ineligibility, 1996–1998
NOTE: Families with school-aged children become ineligible at 185% of the poverty 
line.
SOURCE: Newman (2006), Tables 10–12, and author’s analysis. See Table 9.2 of this 
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tains such items as cereal, peanut butter, juice, cheese, milk, and eggs; 
participants have some choice regarding combinations of certain items. 
The cost of a WIC food package for a particular participant category 
is not routinely collected or estimated. The most comprehensive work 
in this area, by Davis and Leibtag (2005), examines the role of food 
prices, caseload composition, and cost-containment practices in affect-
ing a state’s WIC food package costs for 17 selected states under study. 
For purposes of defi ning a common cross-state food package standard 
by which to compare food package costs, Davis and Leibtag used the 
maximum quantity of food available in each food package. However, 
while WIC can provide a particular client with a prescription of foods 
up to the maximum set by federal regulation, WIC tries to tailor the 
amounts of a package’s individual food items to the individual client to 
match preferences and avoid waste. The average prescriptions are typi-
cally below the maximum prescriptions. For example, in April 2004 the 
federal maximum prescription for milk was 24 quarts, but only 2.1 per-
cent of children received the federal maximum. At the time, the average 
quantity of milk prescribed was 16.8 quarts (USDA 2006c). To better 
approximate the pattern of actual prescriptions, this chapter takes into 
account, by item, that the average quantity received by a child nationally 
may be below the federal maximum, resulting in a slight adjustment to 
the work by Davis and Leibtag. Table 9.3 shows the estimated value of 
the children’s food package for each of the 17 selected states, based on 
prices reported by Information Resources Inc. for the market areas in the 
state; as Davis and Leibtag note, these prices may not be representative 
of prices in the entire state. The table shows $32.52 as the simple aver-
age across the 17 states. This fi gure is used as the baseline value for M. 
WIC Recertifi cation Costs
An estimate of agency recertifi cation costs is derived using three 
factors: a fi gure for the hourly wage rate for direct staff time, a fi gure 
for the direct staff time (in hours) associated with recertifi cation, and a 
percentage fi gure for an overhead rate. The cost fi gure that is derived is 
for 1998; that year is within the 1997–1999 range for which the WIC 
food package costs were derived and also within the 1996–1998 range 
of the Newman income volatility data. 
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Among the public health nutrition workforce in Full Time Equiva-
lent positions, four-fi fths (81 percent) of employees are employed in 
WIC programs (USDA 2003). Across the 2,200 local agencies and 
10,000 WIC service sites, caseload and staffi ng vary. Some local agen-
cies have one or two staff while others have more than 350 (USDA 
2006a, p. 14) Various staff have administrative, nutrition counseling, 
and medical skills. Tasks involved with certifi cation (as opposed to pro-
viding WIC benefi ts in the form of nutritional counseling or breast-
feeding promotion) include determining identity, state of residency, and 
income eligibility; measuring height and weight; drawing blood and 
doing analysis; and determining nutritional risk. At the local level, WIC 
uses a variety of approaches and different combinations of profession-
als, paraprofessionals, and WIC’s “competent professional authorities” 
to conduct the various certifi cation tasks.13 The simulations use Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) data to estimate a 1998 fi gure for total hourly 
Table 9.3  Estimated WIC Children’s Food Package Cost by State, 
1997–1999



















SOURCE: Davis and Leibtag (2005) and author’s analysis.
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compensation across “health care and social assistance employees” in 
state and local government to proxy what weighted-average combina-
tion of employees’ wages and times may affect certifi cation cost in any 
particular locality.14 
The National Compensation Survey of the BLS reports that the 
cost per hour worked (in terms of wages and salaries) for health care 
and social assistance employees in state and local government av-
eraged $23.53 in the second quarter of 2006, representing 65.9 per-
cent of total compensation (BLS 2008).15 Because the BLS recently 
shifted from the Standard Industrial Classifi cation (SIC) system to 
the North American Industry Classifi cation System (NAICS), the 
time series for NAICS fi gures begins only in 2004; thus, an NAICS 
fi gure for 1998 is not available. However, the SIC fi gure from BLS for 
1998 for wages and salaries of “all workers” in state and local govern-
ment is $19.19 per hour, representing 70.3 percent of total compensa-
tion. Thus, the total compensation in 1998 for all workers was $27.30. 
An adjustment of this fi gure downward, to better estimate total compen-
sation of health care and social assistance employees who staff WIC, re-
sults in a estimate of $25.40 in total compensation per hour for 1998.16 
This fi gure is used as an approximation of a weighted-average wage 
rate across staff involved with WIC certifi cations.
Among the documents the Offi ce of Management and Budget 
(OMB) provides for guidance and reference is a general guide to ben-
efi t-cost analysis that states the following: 
When calculating labor costs, the OMB recommends using prevail-
ing wage rates and salaries. To arrive at fully burdened costs when 
estimating personnel costs for government employees, you must 
add overhead costs to salary and fringe-benefi t costs. . . . Some 
examples of indirect costs include rent, utilities, insurance, indirect 
labor, and other expenses typically charged to the organization as a 
whole. . . . For evaluation purposes, costs (both direct and indirect) 
should be included if they will change with the introduction of a 
proposed system (Federal CIO Council 1999, pp. 14–15).
It is sensible to account for indirect costs. A change in certifi cation 
policy can have long-term and large-scale effects on the caseload and 
on the agency’s overall staffi ng and capacity to service that caseload. 
If certifi cation periods were changed nationally, states could change (at 
least in the long term) not only staffi ng but also offi ce space, equipment, 
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and the like, to support the new fl ow of recertifi cations. Therefore, it 
is suitable for the certifi cation duration model to use a “burdened” or 
a “loaded” hourly labor cost rather than considering wage costs alone. 
The total compensation fi gure estimated for health care and social assis-
tance employees in state and local government for 1998 was estimated 
to be $25.40. To cover all indirect costs as well, this paper applies an 
arbitrary overhead rate of 100 percent to the $25.40 total hourly com-
pensation to obtain a loaded hourly labor cost of $50.80. A sensitivity 
analysis will adopt the extreme factor of 0, implicitly ignoring indirect 
costs altogether. 
For the simulation, a fi gure of 1.5 hours was used for the staff time 
involved with a certifi cation. This fi gure represents a composite of fi g-
ures from six Web sites at the county or state level that inform potential 
WIC applicants of how long they need to plan for conducting a certifi -
cation.17 It is presumed that the 1.5-hour fi gure represents certifi cation 
activity, as opposed to time spent in the provision of nonfood WIC ben-
efi ts in the forms of health referrals, nutrition counseling, and breast-
feeding promotion. Separate appointments at the WIC clinic are often 
made for these other activities.  
Although the time for staff is assumed to be 1.5 hours for certifi ca-
tion, the time for a client is assumed to be two hours to take into account 
travel time. About three-quarters of WIC households earn a wage or sal-
ary. Even those who have no labor income place a value on their time. 
An arbitrary fi gure of $6 an hour is used to estimate the value of time to 
the person—presumably the mother—who brings the WIC child to the 
program for certifi cation.18 An arbitrary fi gure of $5 per certifi cation is 
used for out-of-pocket travel costs for the WIC child’s mother.
Social Discount Rate
 There is a literature on what the concept of the social discount rate 
means, or ought to mean, and how to measure it in terms of an observ-
able private market discount rate. A range of 2 to 10 percent (in real 
terms) may encompass most estimates. The OMB annually provides 
federal agencies with updated discount rates, in support of Circular A-
94 (OMB 1992), which provides guidance on benefi t-cost analysis. As 
of January 2006, real discount rates for use in cost-effectiveness analy-
sis (as opposed to other decisions) were reported as ranging from 2.5 
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percent for a three-year horizon up to 3.0 percent for a 30-year horizon 
(OMB 2006). The simulation uses a monthly discount rate of 0.002 for 
the baseline and an alternative fi gure of 0.004 for sensitivity analysis. 
Excess Burden
OMB Circular A-94 gives a fi gure of 25 percent for ε, excess bur-
den per dollar of taxes, although it also provides for the use of other 
fi gures. The 25 percent fi gure exceeds an estimate of 19.5 percent ef-
fi ciency cost for combined local, state, and federal level taxes relative 
to a nondistortionary, revenue-neutral tax in a study by Jorgenson and 
Yun. Their study was reported to be one of the two studies with the 
broadest scope in a U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce review of 
the compliance and effi ciency cost of taxes (USGAO 2005). The simu-
lation will use the 25 percent OMB fi gure to represent excess burden for 
the baseline, and an alternative fi gure of 19.5 percent.
Simulations of Optimal Certifi cation Durations for WIC Children
Table 9.4 shows the results from the baseline simulation and sen-
sitivity analysis. The fi gure of $112.25, the baseline model’s fi gure for 
recertifi cation costs c, is the sum of taxpayer and client costs. The es-
timated budgetary costs for recertifi cation refl ect $25.40 an hour for 
direct staff cost, a 100 percent overhead factor to obtain loaded labor 
costs, and an estimated time of 1.5 hours for a recertifi cation, resulting 
in a total of $76.20 in budgetary terms. Taking into account an excess 
burden of taxation fi gure of 25 percent, the cost to the taxpayer of a 
recertifi cation is $95.25. The cost to the client is estimated at $17, re-
fl ecting $12 worth of time costs ($6 an hour and two hours of time, 
including the time of the recertifi cation and travel time) and $5 out-
of-pocket travel costs. Social cost per recertifi cation of [(1+ε)cA + cC]
totals $112.25 under the baseline. 
The baseline fi gure for excess burden m is $8.13, equaling εM of 
(0.25) × ($32.52). 
Columns 3 and 4 show the solution to the baseline simulation as a 
pair of values, T* and its associated M(T*), representing the optimal, 
cost-minimizing certifi cation duration and the minimized value of total 
cost that results from using T*. The baseline simulation results in T* of 
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12 months and M(T*) of $486.28. This solution occurs in Figure 9.1, 
which is depicted using the baseline values. Other parameter values 
used in the sensitivity analysis would change the locations and shapes 
of the curves, resulting in new, numerically different solutions T* and 
M(T*).
Sensitivity Analysis: Monthly Benefi ts 
The fi rst sensitivity analysis considers how an optimal certifi cation 
duration might change if a different fi gure were used for monthly WIC 
benefi ts M and all other parameters were fi xed at their baseline values. 
While the baseline fi gure for M was $32.52 (the 17-state average), the 
WIC children’s food package cost in New York was estimated to be 
$36.27 in Table 9.3. Using the New York fi gure—the highest among the 
17 states in the table—results in a value for m of $9.0675 and for T* of 
11 months (not shown in Table 9.4), which is shorter than the baseline’s 
12. It makes sense that T* is now shorter because it pays to recertify 
more frequently when the potential savings from terminating unwar-
ranted benefi ts is greater. 










Baseline model 112.25 8.13 12 months 486.28
Change from baseline:
double M  112.25 16.26 9 months 540.90
Change from baseline:
overhead factor of 0  64.63 8.13 9 months 304.09
Change from baseline:
ε decreased to 19.5 percent 108.06 6.34 13 months 455.40
Change from baseline:
ρ raised to 0.4 per month 112.25 8.13 16 months 442.10
Change from baseline:  
low income volatility 112.25 8.13 14 months 492.23
Change from baseline:
high income volatility 112.25 8.13 7 months 474.58
SOURCE: Author’s analysis.
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The $3.75 increase in M to the New York fi gure is about 10 percent 
of the baseline value. The increase did lower T* by a month; however, 
such effects are not linear: increasing M by a steady amount does not 
lower T* by one month in steady increments. The curve for recertifi ca-
tion costs steepens sharply as certifi cation duration is lowered, and that 
factor becomes increasingly diffi cult to overcome. Suppose instead that 
monthly benefi ts M were to double, to $65.04—a change in children’s 
WIC food package cost that far exceeds the $3.75 increase (and is far 
outside the 17-state range). Table 9.4 shows that an increase in effective 
benefi ts of this magnitude results in a decrease in T* to nine months, 
down by just three months from the baseline case. 
A doubling of the effective benefi t is not simply a sensitivity anal-
ysis that gauges a relationship between T* and M. While no state is 
known to have a WIC food package cost as high as $65.04 per pack-
age—i.e., per child—in every state there are WIC households in which 
two WIC children (ages one to four) reside. While WIC certifi es and 
provides benefi ts at the level of the individual, a household with two 
WIC children can receive double the food package benefi ts received by 
a household with one WIC child. An imaginable alternative to existing 
certifi cation policy is that the WIC certifi cation period for a WIC house-
hold could depend on the number of children (and, more generally, the 
number of other WIC participants) in the household.
Sensitivity Analysis: Overhead Rate 
In the baseline, an arbitrary overhead rate of 100 percent is applied 
to total compensation (per hour) as part of estimating the WIC agency’s 
cost of recertifi cation. If no overhead factor is applied, the budgetary 
cost per certifi cation would drop by half, to $38.10 [($25.40/hr)(1 ½ 
hr)]. As would be expected, T* drops below the baseline fi gure of 12 
months. The new T* is nine months, equaling the T* from the simula-
tion that considered doubling M. 
Drawing on the result in the previous section that T* depends on the 
relative values of c and m through the term (ρc/m), it would be expected 
that dropping c by half would necessarily result in exactly the same esti-
mated T* as doubling m by doubling M. However, c has not quite fallen 
by half: c is the sum of both cA and cC , and cC is unchanged (at $17). In 
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the end, though, the change in c is close enough to half to yield the same 
nine-month fi gure in both sensitivity analyses. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Excess Burden
As the value for ε varies, everything else being equal, excess burden 
εM will vary in proportion but recertifi cation costs [(1+ε)cA + cC] will 
vary less than proportionately because the component of the recerti-
fi cation costs paid by the client is unaffected by variation in ε. When 
reducing ε from the OMB fi gure of 0.25 to the Jorgenson and Yun fi g-
ure of 0.195, the reduction in percentage terms for excess burden from 
$8.13 to $6.34 is relatively large, while the reduction in recertifi cation 
cost from $112.25 to $108.06 is relatively small, making the (ρc/m) 
necessarily rise. The resulting increase in (ρc/m) drives T* to increase 
from the baseline’s 12-month T* to a new T* of 13 months. With lower 
values for both excess burden and recertifi cation costs, the new M(T*) 
drops from the baseline (to $455.40).  
Sensitivity Analysis: Discount Rate
Doubling the social discount rate from the baseline fi gure of 0.2 per-
cent per month to 0.4 percent per month increases T* from 12 months in 
the baseline to 16 months. M(T*) drops from $486.28 to $442.10 when 
future values are discounted more. 
Sensitivity Analysis: Income Volatility
The pair of income volatility parameters (λ, μ) in the baseline simu-
lation are (0.07725, 0.23175), derived from an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) best fi t of the Newman data. If instead the parameters are select-
ed to provide upper and lower bounds to the three-year average fi gures 
of the state probability path PEI(t), different estimates for T* would re-
sult. Retaining the stipulation that the state probability path has a steady 
state at 0.25 (which is λ/(λ+μ) in the model) means that μ will be three 
times the value of λ for any selected λ. Thus, this sensitivity analysis is 
not being conducted as an exercise in which one parameter is varied and 
all others are held constant. Income volatility is examined here through 
the joint variation of λ and μ. 
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Figure 9.3 shows two smooth state probability paths, a low path and 
a high path, that sandwich the three-year average state probability path 
of the Newman data. The low path is generated by λ = 0.06 (and μ of 
0.18), while the high path is generated by λ = 0.14 (and μ of 0.42). The 
low path is associated with low income volatility (i.e., low parameter 
values for the two income volatility parameters) as well as low values 
of PEI(t) at any given t along the path. Correspondingly, the high path is 
associated with high income volatility and high values of PEI(t).
Table 9.4 shows the results for a scenario that uses the baseline 
parameters except for income volatility, for which low values are used. 
T* increases from 12 months at baseline to 14 months with low income 
volatility. Under high income volatility, T* is seven months. 
Figure 9.3  Average State Probability Path of Income Ineligibility, 




























NOTE: Families with school-aged children become ineligible at 185% of the poverty 
line. 
SOURCE: Table 9.2 and author’s analysis.
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CONCLUSION
The optimal certifi cation duration model shows in algebraic and 
graphical terms two policy trade-offs faced by program administration. 
On the one hand, there is economic savings to be had from detecting 
ineligible clients and terminating unwarranted benefi ts, thus saving the 
excess burden of taxation that is used to fi nance the benefi ts. Recerti-
fi cation is an administrative tool by which to determine whether a cli-
ent is currently eligible. More frequent recertifi cations can reduce the 
excess burden of unwarranted benefi ts. At the same time, though, more 
frequent recertifi cations entail economic costs paid by WIC (ultimately, 
taxpayers) and by clients. In optimal decision-making, the costs of staff 
and equipment, of time and travel, are balanced against the costs of the 
excess burden of unwarranted benefi ts. 
The optimal certifi cation duration model takes into account the 
probabilistic nature of income dynamics and the time-dependency of 
probability paths of exit from eligibility and reentry into eligibility. It 
discounts future benefi ts and costs. It recognizes that there are reper-
cussions to the likelihood and outcomes of future recertifi cations from 
conducting any given recertifi cation.
Despite its strengths, the optimal certifi cation duration model is 
a simplifi ed rendition of the recertifi cation problem that made use of 
workable functional forms (the exponential distribution) and an infi nite-
horizon specifi cation. There is another limitation of the model that mer-
its recognizing. The model focuses on the trade-off between a pair of 
program goals—specifi cally, benefi ts targeting and recertifi cation costs. 
Another program goal that was set aside by the model is client access, 
which refers to sustaining participation by eligibles. Each recertifi cation 
is a burden on the client, entailing monetary and time costs. Frequent 
recertifi cations may act as a barrier or a disincentive to program partici-
pation, potentially decreasing participation by some of the very clients 
whom the program was established to support. Thus, a longer certifi ca-
tion duration may provide a social value in terms of improved client ac-
cess. If so, then the certifi cation durations estimated in the simulations 
may be interpreted as lower bounds of those that would be obtained 
from a fuller model that includes client access. 
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In one respect, introducing client access into the model is easy: sim-
ply defi ne a “cost of client access” function, say A(T), that would be a 
positive function of T, and add it to get a new total cost curve and a new 
cost-minimizing T*. However, to conduct a simulation would now re-
quire fi gures for A(T), fi gures that in turn require knowledge of clients’ 
behavior—knowing by how much participation falls as T varies—and a 
fi gure for the social value of participation by eligibles.
The best-guess values of key parameters resulted in a baseline sim-
ulation of 12 months for the optimal certifi cation duration T*. From the 
theoretical model, it could be expected that an increase in WIC benefi ts 
or higher income volatility would lower T*, while increases in agency 
or client recertifi cation costs, excess burden per dollar of taxes or lower 
income volatility would increase T*. A reason for conducting numerical 
simulations is to gauge the sensitivity in numerical terms of changes in 
T* to changes in parameters. T* varied from 7 to 14 months, depend-
ing on the simulation. Because some WIC households have more than 
one child receiving benefi ts, the model suggests that optimal T* could 
depend on the amount of WIC benefi ts any one household is receiv-
ing rather than on using a common certifi cation duration for all WIC 
children.  
An economic model can help clarify why different voices in the po-
litical process have different recommendations. The optimal certifi ca-
tion duration model shows that there are many factors that affect certifi -
cation durations. Different recommendations on certifi cation durations 
would naturally follow from different notions of the size or strength of 
these factors that are in the model, as well as from different assessments 
of how important are the factors—such as client access—that have been 
left out of the model. Data and economic analysis can serve to quan-
tify factors that may otherwise be impressionistic. The contribution of 
an economic model serves to help provide a common framework for 
analysis and discussion. 
Every model has strengths and limitations; no model is complete. 
The theoretical and simulation results here are not presented as defi ni-
tive, but as a fi rst exploration of an issue of importance to policymakers, 
to program clients, and to the many other stakeholders with interests in 
the operations and effects of USDA food assistance programs.
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Notes
I would like to acknowledge that this work benefi ted from comments by Dean Jolliffe, 
James Ziliak, Peter Gottschalk, Michael LeBlanc, David Smallwood, and Margaret 
Andrews. The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of 
the Economic Research Service or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
  1. To be eligible for WIC, a client must also be considered by a health professional 
to be at nutritional risk. Few applicants do not meet that criterion. Here I focus on 
income as if it were the sole determinant of WIC eligibility. 
 2. Total food cost and average monthly food cost per participant can be found at 
http://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/wisummary.htm (USDA 2008a, accessed April 18, 
2008).
 3. For fi scal 2005, the annual participation fi gures were 1,966,249 women, 2,047,118 
infants, and 4,009,248 children (USDA 2008b).
 4. As noted by Jorgenson, McCall, and Radner, “For the exponential distribution 
of time to failure . . . inspection, like replacement, serves as a point of regenera-
tion of the investment process. This property of the exponential distribution, often 
referred to as the Markovian property or “lack of memory,” is not shared by any 
other distribution of time to failure” (p. 90).  
 5. The parameter μ is a transition rate of reentry for clients who had previously ex-
ited from eligibility, as opposed to a hazard rate of initial entry for the general 
population of ineligibles. Formerly eligible clients constitute a group that can be 
expected to exhibit (a) lower income than the general ineligible population and (b) 
a higher rate at which eligibility is (re)entered.  
 6. The certifi cation duration model makes repeated use of (9.10) and (9.11) and for 
brevity calls them “state probabilities” even though they are properly understood 
as “conditional” in contrast to (9.8) and (9.9). 
 7. There is another pair of probability paths (not shown) for the probabilities that the 
client is either eligible or ineligible at time t, given that the client is ineligible at 
time zero; these two paths are not used here. 
 8. It is this feature of the model that would be absent if hazard rates were non-
constant.
  9. Intuition suggests that the exponent on the [PEE(T)] term in Equation (9.25) should 
be n − 1 rather than n − 2. However, counting the number of passed recertifi cations 
to reach the nth cycle differs from the usual count of “successful trials” in statisti-
cal theory. WIC is examining the optimal certifi cation duration for a client who 
has just been determined to be eligible at the initial application, thus removing one 
PEE(T) (for the initial application) from consideration and changing the exponent 
by 1.
 10. Work in this area includes Bitler, Currie, and Scholz (2003); Gordon, Lewis, 
and Radbill (1997); Klerman and Leibowitz (1990); and Ver Ploeg and Betson 
(2003). 
 11. It is known from earlier studies that income is volatile for women surrounding the 
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birth event, raising the question of how well income dynamics match for house-
holds with WIC children and households with school-aged children. However, 
research fi ndings suggest that many mothers who had been employed before 
pregnancy return to work within the fi rst year after giving birth. Klerman and 
Leibowitz (1990) fi nd that over one-third of mothers were at work within three 
months following birth, and three-quarters within two years. The simulations here 
presume that the volatility surrounding the birth event is suffi ciently resolved by 
the end of the fi rst year that the birth event does not substantially affect income 
dynamics of households with WIC children (ages one to four). 
 12. One small difference in labels is noted: the fi rst month in the table is month 0, 
while in the fi gure it is month 1.
 13. A recent study on WIC staffi ng states that “little specifi c information exists about 
the actual performance of duties throughout the various classifi cations within the 
nutrition workforce, or specifi cally the WIC workforce” (USDA 2006b, p. 31). 
The same study notes that “Some clinics attempt to get both anthropometric and 
blood work from other providers, while some clinics do their own anthropometrics 
and use blood work obtained elsewhere” (p. 21).
 14. A weighted-average approach would draw upon such information as a 1999–2000 
survey of staffi ng and annual salaries reported by the USDA (2003), in which 
the range between the median low salary and the median high salary for vari-
ous positions was $18,804–$25,251 for nutrition assistant, $20,736–$29,163 for 
nutrition technician, $26,352–$39,000 for nutritionist, and $29,661–$43,496 for 
clinical nutritionist; fi ve other job titles and salaries were reported, too. One dif-
fi culty with constructing weighted-average wage rate is that positions with these 
titles have nonuniform duties across local WIC agencies. Another is the absence 
of information on the time each contributes to a certifi cation.
 15. A check on the correspondence between the hourly wage of an actual WIC staff 
position and the BLS fi gure is provided by a job-vacancy notice posted in summer 
2006 by Rice County, Minnesota, seeking a WIC professional—a public health 
nurse or nutrition professional (Rice County 2006). The job activities included “all 
phases of the WIC certifi cation process, including hematological screening.” The 
stated hourly salary range was $19.31–$26.71, for which the midpoint is $23.01, 
which differs from the BLS fi gure by about one half-dollar. 
 16. Quarterly data for 2005 are available for both “health care and social assistance 
employees” and for “all occupations” (both series in the state and local govern-
ment sector). Total compensation was computed for each of four quarters of 2005 
for the two groups using “cost per hour worked” and “percent of total compensa-
tion.” The annual average of the quarterly fi gures is $35.92 for “all occupations” 
and $33.42 for “health care and social assistance.” In 2005, “health care and social 
assistance” workers received (on average) 93.0 percent of the total compensation 
paid to “all occupations.” Applying the 93.0 percent fi gure to the total compensa-
tion for “all workers” in 1998 of $27.30 yields a fi gure of $25.40 for “health care 
and social assistance employees” in that year.       
 17. The six Web sites were selected based only on convenience, rather than for con-
stituting a nationally representative sample. The reported fi gures were “about” 
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30 minutes in Minnesota (MDH 2008); 1–2 hours in Michigan (MDCH 2008); 
1–2 hours in Fairfax County, Virginia (FCHD 2008); “at least” 1½ hours in 
Clinton County, New York (CCHD 2008); “at least” 1½ hours in Utah County, 
Utah (UCHD 2006); and 1½–2 hours in St. Charles County, Missouri (SCCDPH 
2008).
 18. Of those households with WIC children, median annual income (all sources) was 
$15,325 for households with an adult male present and $8,520 for households 
without an adult male present in 1998 (USDA 2001, p. 76, Exhibit 3-22). The 
simulations take the $8,520 fi gure as the annual income (all sources) of a mother 
with a WIC child with or without an adult male present. The assumption of $6 
per hour is consistent with annual earnings of $6,000 and 1,000 hours of annual 
work.    
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